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Thomas G.W. Telfer *

“In my view, a third bankruptcy is one too many.”
Re Hardy (1979), 30 C.B.R. (N.S.) 95 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 3.
“And so a third discharge merely prepares the way for a fourth bankruptcy.”
Re Resnick (1990), 80 C.B.R. (N.S.) 223 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 4.
In 1965, Mr. Rogers filed for bankruptcy. It was not to be his last. Over 25 years,
Rogers worked for a car dealership in Quebec. His career was rather unremarkable except
that Rogers failed to remit proper amounts of income tax. Rogers was not bothered by the
frequent tax arrears. He found a convenient way to deal with his taxes. Drawing on the
1965 bankruptcy experience, he made assignments in bankruptcy in 1975, 1979, 1984
and again in 1987. 1
The court found that Rogers considered the Bankruptcy Act 2 to be “a convenient
means” to “clear away the income tax arrears.” 3
[N]othing useful would be gained by granting him a discharge, with or without conditions.
He has shown repeatedly that he is unable to organize his affairs in such a way as to fulfill
his fiscal responsibilities to his fellow citizens. He makes a mockery of the law and
*
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of the author and may not be reproduced in whole or in part without the written consent of the Canadian
Insolvency Foundation and the author. These materials should not be construed as legal advice or legal
opinions. I would like to thank Western Law student Robyn McLaren JD, 2015 for her research assistance
on this project. I would also like to thank Sarah Gaudet and Stephanie Cavanagh of the Office of the
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1

Rogers (Trustee of) v. Canada (AG) (1989), 77 C.B.R. (N.S.) 315 (Que. Sup. Ct.), at para. 5.

2

R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.

3

Rogers, supra, footnote 1, at para. 8.

3

probably cannot be rehabilitated. At the hearing … he was asked what he proposed to do so
as to avoid a sixth bankruptcy, if he were to be discharged from his fifth. No satisfactory
answer was forthcoming. 4

The court refused to grant Rogers a discharge since he had “severely tested” “the
integrity of the bankruptcy process.” 5 The case demonstrates the tension between
rehabilitation, the fundamental goal of the bankruptcy discharge, and the integrity of the
bankruptcy process.
While fifth time bankruptcies may be infrequent, 6 repeat bankruptcies are not.
However, there have been no comprehensive studies of second, third, fourth and fifth
time bankruptcies in Canada from a policy perspective or an empirical basis. The paper
will combine recent empirical data from the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy
(OSB) with an analysis of case law on repeat bankrupts.
Rehabilitation has been a traditional and important theme in bankruptcy discharge
proceedings. First time bankrupts are able to obtain an automatic discharge as early as 9
months after the date of bankruptcy.

7

However, Canadian bankruptcy law has

traditionally taken the position that a prior bankruptcy will preclude an order of an
absolute discharge. 8 Debtors with three or more bankruptcies are not entitled to an
absolute discharge. In such a situation, the court must refuse, suspend or grant a

4

Ibid at para. 14.

5

Ibid at para. 8.

6

A review of reported case law on the subject only revealed one fifth time bankruptcy. See discussion
below in Part V.

7

8

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 168.1(1)(a)(i) [hereafter BIA].

BIA, supra, footnote 7, at ss. 172, 173(1)(j). See Edouard Martel, “The Debtor’s Discharge from
Bankruptcy” (1971), 17:4 McGill L.J. 718, at p. 738. This provision can be traced back to the Bankruptcy
Act of 1919. See Bankruptcy Act of 1919, S.C. 1919, c. 36, ss. 58-59.

4

conditional order of discharge. 9 Under recent reforms, second time bankrupts must wait

either 24 or 36 months before being entitled to an automatic discharge. 10 The different
treatment of repeat bankrupts suggests that there are other policy objectives at play
beyond rehabilitation. Where there is a repeat bankruptcy, the preservation of the
integrity of the Canadian bankruptcy process may well override the debtor rehabilitation
rationale. 11 The integrity of the bankruptcy regime involves the protection of creditors
and the public through suspensions, conditional discharges or refusals of discharge.
Part I of the paper relies upon recent OSB statistics to demonstrate the extent of
the multiple bankruptcy problem. Part II examines the rehabilitation rationale in light of
repeat bankruptcies. Part III considers the 2009 amendments to the BIA that deal with
second time bankrupts. Part IV discusses third time bankrupts while Part V examines
fourth and fifth time bankruptcies. Part VI asks whether the mandatory counselling
requirements in the BIA are working to solve the problem of repeat bankruptcies. The
paper concludes with Part VII which considers a possible solutions to the problem of
repeat bankruptcies.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE REPEAT BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM AND
RECENT STATISTICS
The 1980s marked a key turning point in the growth in the number of repeat
bankruptcies in Canada. One source suggests that the repeat bankruptcy rate was limited

9

BIA, ibid. These new provisions will be considered in a separate section.

10

11

Ibid., at ss. 168.1(1)(b)(i),-(ii).

Re Pitre (2009), 60 C.B.R. (5th) 108 (Sask. Q.B.), at para. 26. See also Frank Bennett, Bennett on
Bankruptcy, 14th ed. (Toronto: CCH, 2012), at p. 536.

5

to about 2-3% in the late 1970s. 12 Indeed, there are only seven instances of reported cases
involving a repeat bankruptcy that predate 1979. 13 The Audit and Evaluation Branch
(AEB) 2013 report, Evaluation of Mandatory Counselling, notes that while repeat
bankruptcies were “unusual in the 1970s” the rate grew to 10-12% in the 1980s “because
of easier access to credit” and “the emergence of complex financial products.” 14 In 2002,
the Personal Insolvency Task Force estimated a 10% repeat filing rate. 15 While there
have been numerous empirical studies on repeat bankruptcies under the US Bankruptcy
Code, 16 there have been a few Canadian studies devoted to the specific issue of repeat
bankruptcy. 17 Furthermore, there have been no Canadian studies that have assessed
second, third, fourth and fifth time bankruptcies as separate categories.
12

George F. Redling, “Implementation Issues Regarding Bill C-22” (Ottawa: Department of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs, 1992), at para. 12. See also Wally Clare, “Repeat Bankruptcies of Consumer Debtors”
(1990),10:6-8 Insolvency Bulletin 201.
13

Re Beck (1925), 7 C.B.R. 556 (Que. Sup. Ct.); Re Cruickshanks (1936), 18 C.B.R. 57 (N.S.S.C.); Leger v.
Hayes (1938), 20 C.B.R. 19 (Que. Sup. Ct.); Re Handler (Good Wear Shoe Co) (1946), 27 C.B.R. 108 (Ont.
S.C.); Re Volkman (1971), 18 C.B.R. (N.S.) 67 (Que. Sup. Ct.); Re Cameron (1972), 18 C.B.R. (N.S.) 99
(Que. Sup. Ct.); Laramee v. Diamond (1966), 10 C.B.R. (N.S.) 182 (Que. Sup. Ct.).
14

Industry Canada, Evaluation of Mandatory Counselling (Audit and Evaluation Branch, 2013), at p. 1
[hereafter AEB Report]. Clare also identifies a 10% rate in 1990. See Clare, supra, footnote 12. J.M. Ferron
further identifies a 10% rate in 1988. J.M. Ferron, “A Bankruptcy Policy” (1990), 78 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28, at
para. 18.
15

Personal
Insolvency
Task
Force
Final
Report
(2002),
at
p.
49,
online:
<http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/vwapj/pitf.pdf/$FILE/pitf.pdf> [hereafter PITF Report].

16

See e.g., Lance Miller & Michelle M. Miller, “Repeat Filers Under the BAPCPA: A Legal and Economic
Analysis” [2008], Norton Ann Survey of Bankr. L. 509, at p. 509; J.M. Lown & B. Llewellyn, “Repeat
Bankruptcy Filers” (2004), 19 Papers of the Western Family Economics Association, at p. 37. J. Golmant
& T. Ulrich, “Bankruptcy Repeat Filings” (2006), 14 A.B.I. L. Rev. 169, at p. 170; Jean Lown, “Serial
Bankruptcy Filers No Problem” (2007), A.B.I. J. 36, at p. 36; Paul B. Lewis, “The Repeat Bankruptcy
Filer: Some Economic Considerations” (2000), 10 New Directions in Bankruptcy 18, at p. 18.
17

Clare, supra, footnote 12; Shelley Antel, A Demographic and Financial Profile of Second Time
Bankrupts (M.Sc. Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1991) [unpublished]; Ian D.C. Ramsay, “Individual
Bankruptcy: Preliminary Findings of a Socio-Legal Analysis” (1999), 37:1-2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 15; Judith
K. Strand, Tahira K. Hira & Richard B. Carter, “Repeat Consumer Bankruptcy: A Comparative Analysis
with One-time Petitioners in the United States and Canada” (Paper delivered at the AFCPE National
Conference, Nashville, Tennessee, 8-12 November 1994).

6

Statistics from the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy reveal that the

Personal Insolvency Task Force’s 2002 estimate of a 10% repeat filing rate is now out of
date. The most recent 2012 statistics indicate that the Canadian repeat filing rate is
16.11% for consumer bankruptcies. This rate has increased from 2010 to 2012. 18
Percentage of Total Bankruptcies Filed by Consumers with One or More Previous
Bankruptcies: 19
Year
2010
2011
2012

% of Total Consumer Bankruptcies
14.99%
15.57%
16.11%

Provincial statistics reveal that there is a variance in repeat filing rates across the
country. 20

18

If the repeat filing rate takes into account debtors with a prior bankruptcy or a prior consumer proposal
the repeat rate is higher. This rate stands at 20.5% for 2011-2012. AEB Report, supra, footnote 14, at p. 10.

19

Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Draft Report BKHQRA-2157 (Revised), 28 March 2013
[hereafter OSB Statistics #1]. The number of repeat consumer bankruptcies are determined based on
information provided in the Estate Information Summary (EIS) form filed by the trustee in bankruptcy.
This information is captured electronically when the estate is e-filed. OSB analysis indicates that since
September 2009, over 99% of estates are e-filed. Occasionally when estates are filed jointly,
inconsistencies can occur when the EIS information is captured electronically in the database. This
represents a very small percentage of the total number of consumer bankruptcies filed.

20

Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Draft Report BKHQRA-2308, 20 August 2013 [hereafter
OSB Statistics # 2]. Provincial statistics do not provide a regional breakdown or an urban rural analysis.
See Janis P. Sarra, “Economic Rehabilitation: Understanding the Growth in Consumer Proposals” (2008),
online: Insolvency Research Initiative, Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, at pp. 26-28
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1399610>.

7
Percentage of Total Bankruptcies in Province filed by Debtors
who have been Bankrupt on One or More Prior Occasion(s)
25%
20%
15%
10%

2010

5%

2011
2012

0%

Summary of OSB Statistics 2010-2012 21
2010
Number of Filings
All consumer bankruptcies
92694
One or more previous
13897
bankruptcies
2nd time filing bankruptcy
12773
rd
3 time filing bankruptcy
1058
th
4 time filing bankruptcy
59
5th time filing bankruptcy
7

2011
All consumer bankruptcies
One or more previous
bankruptcies
2nd time filing bankruptcy
3rd time filing bankruptcy
4th time filing bankruptcy
5th time filing bankruptcy

21

OSB Statistics #1, supra, footnote 19.

% of total filed
100%
14.99%
13.78%
1.14%
0.06%
0.01%

Number of Filings
77993
12145

% of total filed
100%
15.57%

11045
1010
84
6

14.16%
1.29%
0.11%
0.01%

2012
All consumer bankruptcies
One or more previous
bankruptcies
2nd time filing bankruptcy
3rd time filing bankruptcy
4th time filing bankruptcy
5th time filing bankruptcy
II. THE LEGISLATIVE
OBJECTIVES
1. The 2009 Amendments

Number of Filings
71495
11518

% of total filed
100%
16.11%

10456
977
74
9

14.63%
1.37%
0.10%
0.01

FRAMEWORK

AND

COMPETING

8

POLICY

Prior to the 2009 amendments, the BIA treated all repeat bankrupts in the same
way. In the event of any repeat bankruptcy, a court could not award an absolute discharge.
All repeat bankrupts faced the prospect of a court refusing the discharge or ordering a
suspended or conditional discharge. 22 The 2009 amendments introduced a significant
change with respect to the treatment of second time bankruptcies. The amendments to the
BIA have extended the right of an automatic discharge 23 to second time bankrupts after
waiting a period of either 24 or 36 months. 24 Second time bankrupts without surplus
income are now entitled to an automatic discharge 24 months after the date of bankruptcy
(unless there is an opposition). Second time bankrupts with surplus income may obtain an
automatic discharge 36 months after the date of bankruptcy.

22

BIA, supra, footnote 7, at ss. 173(1)(j), 172(2). Section 173(1)(j) can be traced back to s. 59 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1919. See Bankruptcy Act of 1919, S.C., c. 36, s. 59. This was based on the U.K.
Bankruptcy Act of 1883. See Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (U.K.), c. 52, s. 28(3)(g). See U.K., H.C.,
Parliamentary Debates, vol. 277 col. 816 at 831-32 (19 March 1883) (Mr. Chamberlain).
23

First time bankrupts without surplus income are entitled to an automatic discharge 9 months after the
date of bankruptcy. See BIA, supra, footnote 7, s. 168.1(1)(a)(i). First time bankrupts with surplus income
must wait 21 months before obtaining an automatic discharge. See BIA, supra, footnote 7, s. 168.1(1)(a)(ii).
Stephanie Ben-Ishai, “Discharge” in Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Anthony Duggan, Canadian Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Law: Bill C-55, Statute c.47 and Beyond (Toronto, LexisNexis, 2007), at p. 360.
24

BIA, supra, footnote 7, s. 168.1(1)(b). See Ben-Ishai, ibid at p. 362.

9

The amendments can be traced back to the recommendations of the 2002 Personal
Insolvency Task Force (PITF) and the 2003 Report of the Standing Senate Committee on
Banking, Trade and Commerce. 25 The PITF recommended an automatic discharge for
second time bankrupts with a 24 month waiting period. The waiting period was suggested
so as to provide “a discernible and transparent consequence to individuals using the
bankruptcy system for a second time” 26 and to “provide for greater consistency of
sanction for second-time bankrupts where no opposition to discharge [was] filed.” 27 The
government’s clause-by-clause analysis of Bill C-55 suggests that the new regime was
designed to “streamline the bankruptcy process”

28

and eliminate court appearances in

every case. 29 While creditors, the trustee or the OSB may object to the automatic
discharge, the new second time bankruptcy provisions operate as a default system and set
up “an administrative system without court supervision” for second time bankrupts. 30
Third, fourth and fifth time bankrupts continue to be governed by court supervision.
2. Competing Policy Objectives

25

PITF Report, supra, footnote 15; Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and
Commerce, Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act
and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (Ottawa: 2003), at p. 59.

26

PITF Report, ibid at p. 49.

27

Ibid.

28

Bill C-55: clause by clause analysis, An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to
amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make
consequential amendments to other Acts at cl. 100. Online: http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cilppdci.nsf/eng/h_cl00790.html.

29

Ibid.

30

Bennett, supra, footnote 11, at p. 535.

10

One of the often-cited purposes of bankruptcy law is to permit the rehabilitation
of the debtor “as a citizen, unfettered by past debts.” 31 The bankruptcy regime thus
allows an honest but unfortunate debtor to “reintegrate into the business life of the
country as a useful citizen free from the crushing burden of his or her debts.” 32 The
Ontario Court of Appeal in Bank of Montreal v Giannotti 33 cited the following passage
from Houlden and Morawetz’s Bankruptcy Law of Canada: “The Act permits an honest
debtor, who has been unfortunate in business, to secure a discharge so that he or she can
make a fresh start and resume his or her place in the business community.” 34
The underlying assumption of rehabilitation is that the debtor will be able to make
a “new start” 35 without the need to resort to bankruptcy again. The United States
Supreme Court in Local Loan Co v Hunt 36 emphasized the nature of the fresh start:
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to ‘relieve the honest debtor from the
weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations
and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.’…. This purpose of the act has
been again and again emphasized by the courts as being of public as well as private interest,
in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the
property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing
debt. 37

31

Industrial Acceptance Corp v. Lalonde, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 109, at para. 34, Estey J. See also Vachon v.
Canada (Employment & Immigration Commission), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 417 at para. 39, Beetz J.; Royal Bank
of Canada v. North American Life Assurance Co, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 325, at para. 17, Gonthier J.

32

Roderick J. Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law, (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009), at p. 274. See also Re
Murray (1971), 15 C.B.R. (N.S.) 252 (B.C.S.C.), at paras. 13-15.
33

(2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 544 (C.A.), MacPherson J.A..

34

Ibid at para. 11.

35

Re Newsome, [1927] 3 D.L.R. 828, at para 11 (Ont. S.C.).

36

292 US 234 (1934), at p. 244.

37

Ibid.

11

The “clear field for future effort” assumes that the debtor will be reintegrated into the

economic life of society or will resume his or her place in the community without the
need for another bankruptcy.
Rehabilitation often gives way when there is a repeat filing. The specific
provisions in the BIA that deal with repeat bankruptcies suggest that other considerations
beyond rehabilitation become relevant. In the case of multiple bankruptcies, “the Court’s
focus shifts from a rehabilitative one to one of concern for the integrity of the system,
protection of creditors and as a brake against future assignment.” 38 The British Columbia
Supreme Court in Re Willier 39 recognized the change in policy objectives:
By the time an individual has entered a third bankruptcy, the purpose and intent of the Act
shifts from its remedial purpose of assisting well-intentioned but unfortunate debtors to one
of protecting society, and in particular unsuspecting potential creditors. The best intentions
and hopes of such bankrupts become subordinated to the need to protect others from the
bankrupt's demonstrated financial incompetence, negligence, and carelessness. 40

The competing objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the integrity of the
bankruptcy regime are difficult to reconcile. If one is to preserve the public interest or the
integrity of the bankruptcy regime by refusing the discharge or by imposing a suspension
or conditional order, it will be at the expense of the debtor’s rehabilitation. Indeed
“continued access to the bankruptcy process suggests that rehabilitation has not
worked.” 41 The new automatic discharge for second time bankrupts after 24 or 36 months

38

Pitre, supra, footnote 11, at para. 26. See also Re Chaban (1996), 143 Sask. R. 136 (Q.B.), at para. 7;
Marshall v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1986), 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 118 (B.C.C.A); Nelson (Trustee of) v. Nelson
(1995), 33 C.B.R. (3d) 292 (Sask. Q.B.); Re Alousis (2000), 20 C.B.R. (4th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J.); Re Atkin
(1987), 65 C.B.R. (N.S.) 296 (Ont. S.C.).
39

(2005), 14 C.B.R. (5th) 130 (B.C.S.C).

40

Ibid at para 12.

41

Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System, (New Haven, CT: Yale
University, 1997), at p. 110.

12

has however, provided a compromise in balancing the two objectives; rehabilitation and

the integrity of the system. The automatic administrative discharge fulfills a rehabilitative
function while the waiting period sends a signal that there is a consequence to using the
bankruptcy regime for a second time. The shift from rehabilitation to the integrity of the
bankruptcy regime represents a concern over the control of the moral hazard problem.

3. Moral Hazard and Repeat Bankruptcies
From an economic perspective, the bankruptcy discharge provides individual
debtors with a form of consumption insurance. 42 This creates a moral hazard problem. 43
The bankruptcy discharge therefore “decreases individuals’ incentives to constrain their
consumption and to avoid incurring obligations that they may not be able to repay.” 44
With the availability of the discharge, it is argued that debtors will be incentivized to
“take on more debts and employ the fresh start benefit strategically.” 45 Indeed the moral
hazard problem may well be more prevalent in the event of a repeat bankruptcy. It has
been argued that the moral hazard argument is “premised upon debtors possessing

42

Anthony Duggan, “Consumer Bankruptcy in Canada and Australia: A Comparative Overview” (2006),
Ann. Rev. Insol. L. 857, at p. 860 citing Michelle White, “Abuse or Protection? Economics of Bankruptcy
Reform under BAPCAPA” [2007], Ill. L. Rev. 275, at p. 276. See also Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, “The
Paradoxical Bankruptcy Discharge: Rereading the Common Law-Civil Law Relationship” (2013)
(Available at SSRN 2298486), at pp. 37-38; Ning Zhu, “Household Consumption and Personal Bankruptcy”
(2011), 40:1 J. Legal Stud. 1; Richard M. Hynes, “Optimal Bankruptcy in a Non-Optimal World” (2002),
44 B.C.L. Rev. 1, at p. 1; Michael D. Sousa, “The Principle of Consumer Utility: A Contemporary Theory
of the Bankruptcy Discharge” (2009), 58 U. Kan. L. Rev. 553, at p. 608; Adam Feibelman, “Consumer
Bankruptcy as Development Policy” (2009), 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 63, at p. 92.
43

For a definition of moral hazard see Thomas Jackson, “The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law”
(1985), 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1393, at p. 1402.
44

Adam Feibelman, “Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy” (2005), 13 A.B.I.
L. Rev. 129, at p. 167; Richard M. Hynes, “Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy” (2004), 56 Ala. L. Rev. 121, at p.
154; Hynes, supra, footnote 42; Sousa, supra, footnote 42.
45

Elgueta, supra, footnote 42; Zhu, supra, footnote 42.

13

information about the bankruptcy process and the ability to discharge debt.” 46 While the
moral hazard problem may well be diminished for a first time bankrupt without any
detailed knowledge of the bankruptcy process 47 a repeat bankrupt may be able to draw
upon his or her prior bankruptcy experience with the aim of filing a subsequent strategic
bankruptcy.
Thus, the BIA seeks to avoid the moral hazard problem, establishing that “certain
standards of commercial morality … must be maintained.”

48

The standards of

commercial morality are set out in s. 173(1) of the BIA. If any of the factors are proven, a
court may not grant an absolute discharge and must either refuse, suspend or make a
conditional order of discharge. 49 As Estey J. indicates in Industrial Acceptance v.
Lalonde 50 “the discharge is, however, not a matter of right and the provisions of secs.
[172] and [173] plainly indicate that in certain cases the debtor should suffer a period of
probation.” 51
Thus, an absolute discharge may not be granted where the bankruptcy is brought
on by “rash and hazardous speculations, by unjustifiable extravagance in living, by
gambling, or by culpable neglect.” 52 A prior bankruptcy or a proposal is a relevant factor

46

Sousa, supra, footnote 42, at p. 609. See also Feibelman, supra, footnote 42, at p. 94.

47

Sousa, ibid.

48

Wood, supra, footnote 32, at p. 275.

49

BIA, supra, footnote 7, at s. 172(2).

50

[1952] 2 S.C.R. 109.

51

Ibid at para. 34.

52

Wood, supra, footnote 32, at p. 275; Hynes, supra, footnote 44, at p. 154; Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 23,
at p. 359.

under s. 173(1)(j) and also breaches the BIA’s standard of commercial morality.

14

53

It

follows that a debtor who has filed for bankruptcy three or more times faces the prospect
of a refusal, suspension or a conditional order. The 2009 amendments have altered the
standards of commercial morality for second time bankrupts by offering an automatic
discharge only after 24 or 36 months. The bar against an absolute discharge where there
are three or more bankruptcies and the new second time bankruptcy provisions are in part
a response to the moral hazard problem. However, whether or not there is a moral hazard
problem in any particular case may well turn on the cause of the repeat bankruptcy. 54

53

See Gurniak v. Royal Bank of Canada (2011), 83 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (S.K.Q.B), at para. 27. (s. 173(1)(j) of
the BIA is a “fault-based fact.”)

54

OSB Statistics #2, supra, footnote 20. Reasons for financial difficulties are provided in text format as the
response to Question 14 “Give reasons for your financial difficulties” on Form 79 Statement of Affairs. The
OSB has chosen 17 standard reasons for financial difficulties, as shown in Table 1. Data for student loans,
loans to friends, cosigning loans for others or failure due to a garnishee action is not shown in Table 1.
Using a data cleansing and parsing program, the responses provided to Question 14 are assigned reasons for
financial difficulties by the OSB. Estates may have more than one reason for financial difficulties. For an
earlier study on the causes of repeat bankruptcies see Strand, Hira & Carter, supra, footnote 17, at p. 28.

Table 1: Reasons Reported for Financial Difficulty:
Value as a percentage of total number of reasons reported by bankrupts annually
2010
2011
2012
First time
Repeat
First time
Repeat
First time
Overuse of credit,
mismanagement, too
much debt
Insufficient income
Unemployment
Health concerns,
medical expenses,
injuries, family deaths
Marital
Breakdown/Divorce
Business failure, use
of personal credit for
business
Supporting parents,
brothers-sisters,
relatives
Tax liabilities
Accidents/emergencies
related to property, i.e.
fire, theft
Bad/poor investments
Moving, relocation of
expenses, job change
Legal action
Alcoholism, drug
addiction, substance
abuse
Gambling

15

Repeat

30.33%

28.72%

29.93%

28.43%

29.35%

27.66%

18.73%
15.33%

18.94%
13.39%

18.49%
14.28%

18.54%
12.85%

17.93%
13.74%

18.96%
12.13%

9.86%

13.48%

10.37%

13.65%

10.71%

14.20%

8.51%

6.99%

9.08%

7.32%

9.69%

7.06%

5.76%

5.39%

5.88%

5.68%

6.23%

5.74%

2.57%

1.90%

2.55%

1.72%

2.43%

1.57%

2.04%

3.54%

2.37%

4.26%

2.76%

5.08%

1.13%

1.18%

1.22%

1.31%

1.27%

1.24%

1.05%

1.05%

1.08%

0.88%

1.07%

0.77%

0.82%

0.63%

0.81%

0.67%

0.80%

0.72%

0.74%

0.90%

0.82%

0.98%

0.87%

0.89%

0.71%

0.83%

0.76%

0.82%

0.74%

0.86%

0.75%

1.10%

0.68%

0.94%

0.71%

0.97%

16
One argument is that there are two types of repeat bankrupts: “behavioural and
structural repeat filers.” 55 A behavioural debtor will “over-value current consumption and
underestimate future costs.” 56 In other words, the first type of repeat filer simply “cannot
stop spending beyond their means.” 57 As noted in Table 1, overuse of credit is the leading
reason given as the cause of bankruptcy for both first time and repeat bankrupts. This
suggests that there is a significant moral hazard problem when the cause of failure is
misuse of credit.
In contrast, a structural repeat filing results from “external factors such as job loss,
medical problems, and divorce.” 58 This second type of repeat filer uses bankruptcy to
“smooth consumption during economic distress” 59 which has been caused by one of the
external factors. Unemployment, 60 health concerns 61 and marital breakdowns 62 have all

55

Miller & Miller, supra, footnote 16, at p. 516. See also Stephen J. Spurr & Kevin M. Ball, “The Effects
of a Statute (BAPCPA) Designed to Make it More Difficult for People to File for Bankruptcy” (2013), 87
Amer. Bankr. L.J. 27, at p. 29.

56

Miller & Miller, ibid. See also Saul Schwartz, “Personal Bankruptcy Law: A Behavioural Analysis” in J.
Niemi-kiesilainen, I. Ramsay & W. Whitford eds. Consumer Bankruptcy in a Global Perspective (Oxford;
Hart Publishing, 2003), at p. 66.
57

Miller & Miller, ibid.

58

Ibid at 517.

59

Ibid. For an earlier study of the causes of repeat bankruptcies see Ramsay, supra, footnote 17.

60

See e.g. Re Hiebert, [2008] 315 Sask. R. 118 (Q.B.), at paras. 4-6; Re Sussman (1990), 77 C.B.R. (N.S.)
310 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 1-4; Re Langill (2006), 21 C.B.R (5th) 33 (B.C.S.C.), at paras. 6-8; Re Pace
(2006), 246 N.S.R. (2d) 236 (S.C.), at para. 2; Re Alonce (2003), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 20 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 3.
61

See e.g. Re Miller (2007), 257 N.S.R. (2d) 318 (S.C.), at para. 4; Re Judd (1989), 76 C.B.R. (N.S.) 177
(B.C.S.C.), at para. 2; Re Meek (2009), 50 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 1; Re Mulligan (2007), 38
C.B.R. (5th) 89 (B.C. S.C.), at para. 6; Re Nelson (2010), 69 C.B.R. (5th) 292 (B.C.S.C), at para. 6.
62

See e.g. Re Bernier, 2012 QCCS 6166 at para. 14; Re Williams (2005), 10 C.B.R. (5th) 304 (B.C.S.C.), at
para. 2; Re Overly (2002), 169 Man. R. (2d) 229 (Q.B.), at para. 5; Re Randall (1984), 54 C.B.R. (N.S.)
121 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 3; Re Kusch (2007), 33 C.B.R. (5th) 208 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 6.
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been identified as causes of bankruptcy in Table 1. Financial failure in these situations
may be unexpected, sudden or unanticipated. In these circumstances, the moral hazard
problem may not be as significant as the bankruptcy may not be strategic. However, since
more than one reason for failure may be recognized in any particular filing it may be
difficult to measure the exact nature of the moral hazard problem. A debtor may identify,
for example, health concerns or medical expenses together with the overuse of credit.
Substance abuse 63 and gambling 64 have also been identified as causes of bankruptcy. This
kind of so-called “compulsive behaviour” 65 accounts for less than two percent of the
reported causes of bankruptcy for repeat bankrupts. 66
III. SECOND TIME BANKRUPTS
1. The New Second Time Bankruptcy Regime
The 2009 amendments are having a profound the impact on the bankruptcy
regime. For 2010 filings, 84% of all second time bankrupts received an automatic
discharge after 24 months. 67 The 36 month surplus income provision, however, is having
less of an impact. Although the 36 month provision was designed to substantially
63

See e.g. Re Loiselle, 2013 QCCS 1391 at para. 14; Re Perreault (2011), 200 A.C.W.S. (3d) 317 (Que.
Sup. Ct.), at para. 29; Re Brown (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 35 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 3; Re Bice (2007), 38 C.B.R.
(5th) 83 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 1.
64

See e.g. Pitre, supra, footnote 11, at para. 6; Re Lok (2010), 71 C.B.R. (5th) 98 (Sask. Q.B.), at para. 5;
Re Hosseini (2008), 48 C.B.R. (5th) 222 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), at para. 2; Re Bury (2007), 34 C.B.R. (5th) 263
(Alta. Q.B.). at para. 1; Re Tang (2007), 29 C.B.R. (5th) 258 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), at para, 3.
65

See Carole Anne Curnock “Insolvency Counselling – Innovation based on the Fourteenth Century”
(1999), 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 387, at p. 392.

66

Curnock, supra, footnote 65, at p. 404. Curnock concludes that “bankruptcy resulting from psychosocial
problems only applies to an extremely small minority of debtors.” Curnock’s conclusion is more consistent
with OSB Statistics #2, supra, footnote 20, than an earlier OSB study which suggested that 30 percent of
repeat bankrupts were related to substance abuse with a possible even greater percentage bankrupts having
gambling debts. The author was unable to locate a copy of the earlier study but it is referenced in Ferron,
supra, footnote 14, at para. 21.
67

OSB Statistics #1, supra, footnote 19.
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increase the “total funds payable to the trustee for distribution to creditors” 68 for 2010
filings, only 168 bankrupts with surplus income received an automatic discharge after 36
months. This represents 2% of all second time bankruptcies in 2010.
Automatic Discharges after 24 or 36 months 69
2010 Filings
Auto. Discharge 24 months
Total Number Discharged
7225
% of all second time 84%
bankruptcies

Auto. Discharge 36 months
168
2%

The BIA is silent on the issue of how much time must elapse before a debtor may
file for bankruptcy again. In the United States, where a debtor has received a discharge in
the first bankruptcy, the debtor “is absolutely precluded from receiving a discharge in a
second case under chapter 7 within eight years.” 70 There is no equivalent time bar in the
BIA, however, it is OSB policy that “if a person has filed a second bankruptcy within a
three year period subsequent to a previous discharge” 71 the file will automatically be
flagged by the OSB for review to determine whether the OSB should intervene in the
bankruptcy discharge hearing.
Prior to 2009, there was little consistency in the length of judicial suspensions for
a second time bankrupt in the reported case law. At one end of the spectrum, some
Alberta courts imposed lengthy suspensions ranging from 10 72 to 25 years. 73 At the other

68

Re Kuss (2009),55 C.B.R. (5th) 289 (Atla. Q.B.), at para. 10.

69

OSB Statistics #1, supra, footnote 19.

70

Charles Jordan Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy, 2d ed. (New York, NY: Thomson Reuters/Foundation
Press, 2009), at p. 970. “The eight-year period is computed from the date of commencement of case 1 to the
commencement of case 2, not from discharge to discharge.” See also Hon William L. Norton Jr. & William
L. Norton III, Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice, 3d ed. (Thomson Reuters, 2013), § 86:18 (Westlaw).
71

Email from Leona Luk, Senior Bankruptcy Analyst, OSB to Thomas Telfer, 24 September 2013. The
OSB will also determine whether a referral should be made to the Special Investigations Unit (SIU). The
SIU may in turn pass the file to the RCMP.

72

Re Zapisocki (2002), 316 A.R. 207 (Q.B. Reg.).
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end of the scale in Re Doe, 74 an Ontario court imposed a 1 month suspension where the
first bankruptcy had preceded the second by 13 years.

75

In fact, outside of Alberta,

suspensions ranged from 1 month 76 to 3 years. 77
Parliament chose to replace the judicial discretionary regime with a default rulebased automatic discharge system. 78 On the one hand, the second time discharge system
avoids costly discharge hearings and imposes a national standard that will be applied
wherever the bankrupt is residing. 79 On the other hand, bright-line rules may not always
do justice on the merits of each case. Unless there is an objection, the new regime is not
able to discern whether or not the bankruptcy arose from a moral hazard problem.

73

Re O’Dell (2000), 269 A.R. 199 (Q.B. Reg.); Re Cardinal (2000), 267 A.R. 199 (Q.B. Reg.). The Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench in Re Walterhouse reduced a 25 year suspension to a 5 year suspension on the
basis that such a lengthy suspension was tantamount to a refusal of a discharge. Re Walterhouse (2002),
318 A.R. 394 (Q.B.).
74

(1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 105 (Ont. Ct. of J.).

75

Ibid. See also Sussman, supra, footnote 60 (court imposed a 3 month suspension); Re Perpich, 2006
CarswellOnt 6821 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), at para. 13 (6 month suspension); Re Steward, 2000 CarswellOnt 5465
(Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (6 month suspension).
76

Re Kolody (1999), 178 Sask. R. 137 (Q.B. Reg.); Re Rubin (2011), 74 C.B.R. (5th) 231 (B.C.S.C.).

77

See Re Maurer (2001), 31 C.B.R. (4th) 69 (B.C.S.C.) (2 months); Re Côté 2010 QCCS 412 (3 months);
Re Ducas, 2010 QCSC 413 (3 months); Re Handfield, 2010 QCSC 415 (3 months); Re Grier (1998), 132
Man. R. (2d) 26 (Man. Q.B.) (4 months); Re Brown (2010), 364 Sask. R. 300 (Q.B.) (conditional order
combined with a 6 months); Re Giera (2008), 172 A.C.W.S. (3d) 292 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (conditional order
combined with 6 months); Gurniak, supra, footnote 53 (conditional order combined with 6 months); Re
Muzlera (2011), 81 C.B.R. (5th) 113 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (6 months); Overly, supra, footnote 62 (6 months);
Re Kaufman, 2005 CarswellOnt 3405 (Sup. Ct. J.) (9 months with conditional order); Re Cookson, 1996
CarswellOnt 1416 (Ont. Bankr.) (9 months); Re White, 1997 CarswellNS 570 (N.S.S.C.) (1 year); Re
Beaule, (1985) 47 Sask. R. 159 (Q.B.) (conditional order combined with a 1 year); Re Grandoni (2007), 31
C.B.R. (5th) 282 (B.C.S.C.) (1 year); Re Steeves (2009), 61 C.B.R. (5th) 84 (B.C.S.C.) (1 year); Re Robson
(2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 274 (B.C.S.C.) (18 months); Beck, supra, footnote 13 (2 years); Re Baldwin, 1997
CarswellBC 607 (S.C.) (2 years); Re Freeman (1984), 54 C.B.R. (N.S.) 181 (B.C.S.C.) (3 years); Re
Wortsman (1984), 53 C.B.R. (N.S.) 45 (Ont. S.C.) (3 years).
78

On the difference between rules and standards see Thomas G.W. Telfer, “Voidable Preference Reform: A
New Zealand Perspective on Shifting Standards and Goalposts” (2002), 12 Int. Insolv. Rev. 55, at p. 62.

79

PITF Report, supra, footnote 15, at p. 49.
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Creditors, trustees and the Superintendent of Bankruptcy 80 must be diligent in deciding
whether to oppose an automatic discharge. Will an automatic discharge in the second
case set the stage for a third bankruptcy?
2. Second Time Bankruptcies Pre 2009 Amendments
As creditors, trustees or the Superintendent of Bankruptcy can object to the
automatic discharge and force a hearing, second time jurisprudence that pre-dates the
amendments remains relevant. Stephanie Ben-Ishai, writing in 2007 suggested that the
“rhetoric found in decisions on discharge would aid in providing further insight into the
role and form of dispute resolution in consumer bankruptcy.” 81 The case law reveals
judicial attitudes towards second time bankrupts.
There are some common themes in second time bankruptcy jurisprudence. Courts
have been reluctant to allow debtors to periodically use the BIA to obtain a release of
their debts. 82 In Re Lebel 83 Anderson J. concluded that the Bankruptcy Act was “not to be
considered a process which can be had resort to on a regular basis with a view to washing
out one's debts.” 84 A further theme is the emphasis upon the maintenance of the integrity
of the bankruptcy system. In Re Bury 85 the court concluded that where there is a repeat or

80

BIA, supra, footnote 7, s. 168.2 on oppositions to an automatic discharge.

81

Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 23, at p. 370.

82

Re Walker (1998), 226 A.R. 212 (Q.B.); Re Ross (2001), 22 C.B.R. (4th) 138 (Alta. Q.B.); Re Czaja,
2000 ABQB 949; Re Unrau (2001), 26 C.B.R. (4th) 106 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 6; Re Hatton (1979), 32
C.B.R. (N.S.) 77 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 2.
83

(1979), 31 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320 (Ont. S.C.).

84

Ibid at para 2.

85

Bury supra, footnote 64.
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dishonest bankrupt, “the purpose of the Act shifts toward the protection of society, the
upholding of the integrity of the Act and the sanctioning of inappropriate behavior.” 86

The balance between rehabilitation and the integrity of the system is tested when
a debtor repeats patterns of financial misbehavior over two bankruptcies. Perhaps the
most common and overriding theme in the reported case law is the tendency of a debtor
to fail a second time for the same or similar reasons as the first bankruptcy.

87

In Re

Tang 88 the court refused a discharge:
It would be one thing if this second bankruptcy were the result of misfortune. It is not. It is
solely the result of the Bankrupt engaging in the same reckless and destructive behaviour
as led to his first bankruptcy. Not only that, but he engaged in business practices which,
although clearly legal, effectively preyed on the very weakness in others which has led him
into bankruptcy not once but twice….This is not the hallmark of either an honest or
unfortunate debtor, and such a debtor is not deserving, I find, of the fresh start afforded by
the BIA. 89

In Re Martens 90 both bankruptcies were “tax driven”. The bankrupt decided not to
file tax returns or pay income tax “and periodically absolve[d] herself of her legal
obligations by going to the bankruptcy trough, not once but twice.” 91 “Having struck

86

Ibid at para.10. See also Re Fraser (2009), 53 C.B.R. (5th) 80 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 18.

87

Kealey v. Minister of National Revenue, 1999 CarswellOnt 2188 at para. 64 (Ct. J.). See also Bury, ibid at
para. 10; Fraser, ibid at para. 18;, Re Owen (2010), 71 C.B.R. (5th) 297, (N.B.Q.B.), at para. 9; Re Evans
(1997), 211 A.R. 76 (Q.B.), at para. 14; Re Hockenhull, [2001] O.J. No. 3061 (Sup. Ct. J.); Re Ngoka
(1998), 174 Sask. R. 3 (Q.B.); Re Jolin (2008), 170 A.C.W.S. (3d) 237 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), at para. 12; Re
Chronopoulos, 2007 CarswellOnt 6981 (S.C.); Williams, supra, footnote 62, at para. 12; Re Patrick, [2000]
O.J. No. 3150 (Sup. Ct. J.).

88

Supra, footnote 64.

89

Ibid at para. 7.

90

[1994] A.J. No. 1265 (Q.B.).

91

Ibid at para. 3.
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upon what she thought was a good scheme the bankrupt simply continued her obdurate
conduct.” 92
In this extreme case the overriding principle must be a message. The message is that tax
cheaters are free riders and they should not be absolved from that. The bankrupt refused to
"rehabilitate" herself after the first bankruptcy. She just carried on in the same pattern. The
Act is to be just a convenient ink remover, she thinks, removing what is in the Minister's
ledger sheets against her. 93

The AEB survey of Trustees, Creditors and the OSB confirms this important
theme found in the jurisprudence. A common problem with repeats “is that they fall back
into their bad practices once they get out. They convince themselves they won’t make the
same mistake.” 94 Debtors simply do not “learn from the initial bankruptcy” 95 and “fail
again for the same reasons as their first bankruptcy.” 96
In many situations the rehabilitative aspects of the first bankruptcy have no impact
on the bankrupt. In Re Gleeson 97 Registrar Ferron came to this conclusion:
The extinguishment of the bankrupt's debts as a result of the discharge in his first
bankruptcy was meant to give the debtor a fresh start. The rehabilitative aspects of that
process were lost on the bankrupt and there is no reason to think that a discharge at this
point in the second bankruptcy would have the effect which the bankruptcy is supposed to
have. 98
92

Ibid at paras. 6-8.

93

Ibid at para. 31.

94

Trustee #3, Trustee Responses to Question Four, Appendix C, AEB Report, supra, footnote 14. Answers
disclosed pursuant to Access to Information Act, Letter from Kimberly Eadie, Director, Information &
Privacy Rights Administration to Thomas Telfer, 26 August 2013 [hereafter Access to Information Act].
95

Creditor #3, Creditor Responses to Question Four, Appendix C, AEB Report, supra, footnote 14; Access
to Information Act, ibid.

96

OSB #6, OSB Responses to Question Four, Appendix C, AEB Report, supra, footnote 14; Access to
Information Act, ibid.

97

98

(1990), 80 C.B.R. (N.S.) 127 (Ont. S.C.).

Ibid at para. 7. See also Re Osesky (2002), 31 C.B.R. (4th) 80 (Man. Q.B.), at para. 17 (refusal of
discharge); Hatton, supra, footnote 82, at para. 2; Re Snihur (1985), 53 C.B.R. (N.S.) 149 (Ont. S.C.), at
para. 5; Re Lloyd, 2000 ABQB 497 at para. 5. See also Re O’Keefe, 2001 ABQB 335 at para. 11; Re
Koehler (2001), 24 C.B.R. (4th) 59 (Alta. Q.B.); Ross, supra, footnote 82, at para. 8.
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Indeed evidence of altered behavior may be key to a favourable order of discharge in a
second bankruptcy. In Re Hatton 99 Anderson J concluded that a second or subsequent
bankrupt bears a heavy onus “to establish some change in his financial pattern which
warrants the court making the order sought.” 100
IV. THIRD TIME BANKRUPTCIES
While the BIA makes it clear that where there is a prior bankruptcy the court shall
refuse, suspend or impose a conditional discharge, 101 there are no other specific
provisions dealing with third, fourth and fifth time bankrupts. However, where there are
three or more bankruptcies the OSB will automatically flag the file for review to
determine whether or not to intervene in the discharge hearing. 102 Further, it is the OSB’s
position that where there are three or more bankruptcies, the debtor should remain in
bankruptcy for a minimum of 36 months. 103 Third time bankrupts represent a small
percentage of total consumer filings. However, one should not easily dismiss the fact that
over the past three years there have been 3045 third time bankruptcies.

99

Supra, footnote 82.

100

Hatton, supra, footnote 82, at para. 2. See also Snihur, supra, footnote 98, at para. 5; Hosseini, supra,
footnote 64, at para. 16.

101

BIA, supra, footnote 7, at ss. 173(1)(j), 172(2).

102

Luk, supra, footnote 71. The OSB will also determine whether a referral should be made to the Special
Investigations Unit (SIU). The SIU may in turn pass the file to the RCMP.

103

Ibid.
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Summary of OSB Statistics 2010-2012 Third Time Bankruptcies 104
2010
All consumer bankruptcies
One or more previous
bankruptcies
3rd time filing bankruptcy

Number of Filings
92694
13897

% of total filed
100%
14.99%

1058

1.14%

2011
All consumer bankruptcies
One or more previous
bankruptcies
3rd time filing bankruptcy

Number of Filings
77993
12145

% of total filed
100%
15.57%

1010

1.29%

2012
All consumer bankruptcies
One or more previous
bankruptcies
3rd time filing bankruptcy

Number of Filings
71495
11518

% of total filed
100%
16.11%

977

1.37%

In Re Lynn 105 Suche J. concluded that “third time bankruptcies are of grave
concern, often demonstrating a degree of irresponsibility that justifies simply refusing a
discharge.” 106 Justice Anderson in Re Hardy 107 concluded that a “third bankruptcy is one
too many.” 108 Justice Anderson’s comment has been characterized as a “‘three strikes’”
rule.” 109 While it has been held that “there is no rule of law that a third time bankruptcy

104

OSB Statistics #1, supra, footnote 19.

105

(2012), 278 Man. R. (2d) 101 (Q.B.).

106

Ibid at para. 22; Re Willier (2005), 14 C.B.R. (5th) 130 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 8. See also Re Grasdal
(2001), 290 A.R. 389 (Q.B.), at para. 8.

107

(1979), 30 C.B.R. (N.S.) 95 (Ont. S.C.).

108

Ibid at para. 3.

109

Willier, supra, footnote 106, at para. 8.
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must result in refusal of discharge… the court must nevertheless pay very careful
attention to the future prospects of a third time bankrupt.” 110
The grave concern over third time bankruptcies is reflected in the judicial rhetoric
in the case law. In refusing a discharge in Re Garness, 111 the court characterized the
bankrupt as having “a SARS-like presence in the local economic community.” 112 Over
three bankruptcies, the debtor had incurred debts of over $579,000. According to the
court, the bankrupt and the economic community needed “further economic quarantine
before discharge [could] be possible.” 113 In Re Frolick 114 the trustee recommended that a
third time bankrupt be discharged without conditions. In refusing the application for the
discharge, Registrar Funduk stated: “Why not go the extra step and also recommend that
the bankrupt be given a medal for his ability to fornicate the bankruptcy laws.” 115
The British Columbia Supreme Court in Re Willier 116 acknowledged that an
important shift occurs when there is a third time bankruptcy:
By the time an individual has entered a third bankruptcy, the purpose and intent of the Act
shifts from its remedial purpose of assisting well-intentioned but unfortunate debtors to one
of protecting society, and in particular unsuspecting potential creditors. The best intentions
and hopes of such bankrupts become subordinated to the need to protect others from the
bankrupt's demonstrated financial incompetence, negligence, and carelessness. If there can
be a concept of debtors' recidivism, it is demonstrated in stark relief by a third-time
bankrupt. 117

110

Pace, supra, footnote 60, at para. 14. See also Re Randall, supra, footnote 62, at para. 10.

111

(2004), 5 C.B.R. (5th) 51 (B.C.S.C.).

112

Ibid at para. 21.

113

Ibid.

114

(2001), 294 A.R. 198 (Q.B.).

115

Ibid at para. 16.

116

Supra, footnote 106.

117

Willier, supra, footnote 106, at para. 12.
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The integrity of the bankruptcy system involves the protection of creditors and the public
through a refusal of a discharge, suspension or a conditional order. 118
Third time bankruptcy jurisprudence also reveals judicial concern for debtors who
make the same mistakes again. In the context of the third bankruptcy, Re Lynn 119 defined
rehabilitation in this way:
“Rehabilitation”, in a behavioral context… is comprised of two elements: recognition of
wrongdoing and a willingness to change. It is a means of establishing some trust
that…there is a “realistic and reliable likelihood that the mistakes will not be repeated.” 120

To consider a discharge for a third time bankrupt “the court must be satisfied that the
bankrupt has gained sufficient insight and made sufficient changes in his or her life that it
is not reasonably possible that further bankruptcy will occur.” 121 An acknowledgement of
“blame and acceptance of individual responsibility for the consequences” 122 of the
bankruptcy is essential. Without this acknowledgment the bankrupt may simply repeat
past practices. The court must be convinced that “something has been learned by the
bankrupt that will give some sense of assurance that the cycle of bankruptcy has been
broken.” 123 Creditors of a third time bankrupt are “absolutely entitled to a realistic and
reliable likelihood that the mistakes will not be repeated.” 124

118

Pitre, supra, footnote 11, at para. 26; Chaban, supra, footnote 38, at para. 7. See also Re Beauregard,
2012 QCSC 6401.

119

(2012), 278 Man. R. (2d) 101 (Q.B.).

120

Ibid at para. 34. See also Re Scattergood (2010), 66 C.B.R. (5th) 103 (B.C. Master), at para. 4; Re
Resnick (1990), 80 C.B.R. (N.S.) 223 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 4.

121

Willier, supra, footnote 106, at para. 13.

122

Re Garness (2004), 5 C.B.R. (5th) 51 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 19.

123

Pace, supra, footnote 60, at para. 14; Miller, supra, footnote 61, at para. 15.

124

Garness, supra, footnote 122, at para. 19.
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Registrar Ferron refused to grant a discharge to a third time bankrupt in Re
Flowerday. 125 The court identified a pattern of abuse and concluded that rehabilitation
was not possible in this situation:
The pattern is obvious. Debts are accumulated over a five-year period and then the debtor
files in order to receive a fiscal clearance. This is an abuse of the system which is not to be
tolerated. The bankrupt has obviously learned nothing from his previous experiences and is
probably incapable of rehabilitation. 126

Registrar Baker in Re Brown 127 expressed the hope that multiple bankrupts become
bankrupt “for differing reasons.” 128 However, Brown “[dashed] that hope: he [had] been
bankrupt three times, all for the same reason: over-extension of credit.” 129 In 22 years,
Brown had not made “concrete and demonstrable changes” 130 on a long-term basis. There
was no sense that the discharge order would involve notions of rehabilitation. Thus, the
court held that the “world at large [had] to be protected from him.” 131
Despite the judicial rhetoric in the reported case law, statistics reveal that refusals
of a discharge are rare for third time bankruptcies: 132

125

(1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 297 (Ont. Ct. J.).

126

Ibid at paras. 5-6.

127

Brown, supra, footnote 63.

128

Ibid at para. 1.

129

Ibid at para. 2.

130

Ibid at para. 6.

131

Ibid at para. 9. The court suspended the discharge for a period of three years and barred the bankrupt
from making applications for credit (except for a personal residence) for a period of 15 years.

132

OSB Statistics #1, supra, footnote 19.
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Suspensions, Conditional Orders and Refusals of Discharge
3rd Time
Bankruptcies
2010
2011

%
%
Suspensions Conditional
Orders
58.19
40.96
51.38
47.25

% Refusals

0.85
1.38

V Fourth and Fifth Time Bankruptcies
The OSB statistics reveal that fourth and fifth time bankruptcies account for less
than one percent of all consumer bankruptcies. While one might argue that the percentage
of fifth time bankrupts to total filings is statistically insignificant, it is of greater concern
that in 2012, there were 9 fifth time bankruptcies filed.
Summary of OSB Statistics 2010-2012 133
2010
Number of Filings
All consumer bankruptcies
92694
One or more previous
13897
bankruptcies
4th time filing bankruptcy
59
th
5 time filing bankruptcy
7

% of total filed
100%
14.99%
0.06%
0.01%

2011
All consumer bankruptcies
One or more previous
bankruptcies
4th time filing bankruptcy
5th time filing bankruptcy

Number of Filings
77993
12145

% of total filed
100%
15.57%

84
6

0.11%
0.01%

2012
All consumer bankruptcies
One or more previous
bankruptcies
4th time filing bankruptcy
5th time filing bankruptcy

Number of Filings
71495
11518

% of total filed
100%
16.11%

74
9

0.10%
0.01

In a fourth bankruptcy, courts generally apply the same test that is used in a third
bankruptcy:
133

Ibid.
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the test to be applied on a third or fourth bankruptcy shifts from rehabilitating a wellintentioned but unfortunate debtor to one of protecting society generally and unsuspecting
creditors in particular. 134

By the time a fourth bankruptcy is reached:
the primary purpose of any order is to ensure that future creditors are protected while the
bankrupt attempts such rehabilitation. The order must also serve as a deterrent to others in
like circumstances. 135

In many of the reported cases the courts refused to grant a discharge. However, the
actual refusal rate is much lower than that represented in the reported case law. Statistics
from the OSB demonstrate that in 2011 refusals of discharges are also rare for fourth and
fifth time bankruptcies. 136
Suspensions, Conditional Orders and Refusals of Discharge
%
%
% Refusals
Suspensions Conditional
Orders
2010
47.37
26.32
26.32
2011
40.54
54.05
5.41
Like other repeat bankruptcy cases, four time bankrupts follow patterns of past
behavior. In Re Mulligan 137 the court concluded that the bankrupt had not learned from
“her past bankruptcies” and “society [needed] to be protected from Mrs. Mulligan’s
incompetent use of credit.” 138 The court was of the view that the bankrupt “[had]
repeatedly shown that she [could not] budget within her means.” 139 The court suspended
the discharge for a period of 15 years.
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In Re Kusch 140 the bankrupt claimed that he was not at fault for his first three
bankruptcies. While the court acknowledged that the bankrupt “had some misfortune” 141
there was “no indication that he [accepted] any personal responsibility for it.” 142 The
court refused his discharge:
The number of bankruptcies and his apparent inability to see how his actions may have
contributed to the circumstance leading to the bankruptcy gives me reason to believe that if
I discharge him, I will be setting the stage for bankruptcy number 5. 143

The court concluded that the bankrupt had not “learned anything from [the] past
bankruptcies, other than he was a hapless victim of circumstance.” 144 Master Young
stipulated that the bankrupt could not reapply for a discharge for a period of two years. If
the bankrupt wanted to apply at that time:
then he will have to demonstrate at that time that he has learned something about financial
management and that he can demonstrate financial prudence. The court would, at that time,
be looking for a clear plan as to how he would plan to avoid future financial problems and
some indication that he is implementing that plan. 145

VI. MANDATORY COUNSELLING
In 1992, Parliament amended the BIA to require mandatory counselling for all
bankrupts. 146 Parliament added the mandatory counselling provisions in order to reduce
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the number of repeat bankrupts. 147 The 2013 AEB Report on Mandatory Counselling
concludes that Parliament introduced mandatory counselling “to help avoid repeat
personal bankruptcies by providing debtors with information and education on financial
management.” 148
Writing in 1999, Berry and McGregor optimistically claimed that the introduction
of mandatory counselling “could lead to fewer repeat bankruptcies, better educated
consumers, and rehabilitation of those debtors teetering on the edge, or in the cycle, of
bankruptcy.” 149 In Re Newsham 150 the court identified the underlying goal of mandatory
counselling:
In bankruptcy the debtor is required to attend two counselling sessions. A recognition of
the cause of bankruptcy and the prevention of a repeat bankruptcy is a necessary ingredient
of counselling. Budget preparation and the proper use of credit cards must be an important
component of most counselling sessions. Because of the rise in second, third and fourth
time bankruptcies, counselling to avoid repeat assignments is viewed by the courts as an
important and necessary ingredient in the process. 151

Given the increasing rate of repeat bankruptcies one has to ask whether mandatory
counselling has been effective in preventing repeat bankruptcies. The AEB Report on
Mandatory Counselling concluded that “mandatory counselling addresses a continued
need by contributing to the rehabilitation of debtors and helping them avoid future
259.
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financial difficulties.” 152 According to the Report, “mandatory counselling had a positive
impact on debtors.” 153 The Report specifically assessed mandatory counselling in light of
evidence of repeat bankruptcies. The AEB Report concluded that “debtors who cited the
overuse of credit as a reason for their financial difficulties were less likely to be
repeats.” 154 The Report also concluded that debtors who reported overuse of credit as the
reason for failure “were less likely to be repeat filers.” 155 The AEB Report found that
where a debtor reported overuse of credit “then the probability that the debtor had a
previous bankruptcy or insolvency dropped by 3.7%.” 156
However, the effectiveness of mandatory counselling to combat repeat filings must
be considered in light of the causes of bankruptcies for repeat bankrupts. If bankrupts
were truly gaining financial skills through the mandatory counselling program, one would
expect that misuse of credit would play a much lesser role in the cause of a repeat filing.
OSB data on the causes of bankruptcies demonstrates that for repeats and first time
bankrupts, overuse of credit is the leading cause of bankruptcy and there is similarity in
the response rate. 157 In 2012, repeat bankrupts identified overuse of credit as the cause of
bankruptcy 27.6 percent of the time while first time bankrupts reported overuse of credit
as a reason for financial failure 29.35 percent of the time.
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Beyond misuse of credit a there may be structural 158 reasons for failure. Debtors
may fail for reasons beyond their control. As noted in Table 1, bankrupts have identified
for example, medical concerns as a cause of bankruptcy. One has to ask whether credit
counselling has any impact in this situation. As Saul Schwartz notes “there is no reason to
believe that credit counseling is effective for debtors who file for bankruptcy because
illness prevents them from working.” 159
Further, a review of the jurisprudence confirms that rehabilitation played little role
in preventing subsequent bankruptcies as debtors simply made the same financial
mistakes over and over again. One has to ask whether mandatory counselling will ever
have the potential to prevent repeat bankruptcies. Saul Schwartz’s study indicates that
counselling

does

not

lead

to

“any

appreciable

improvement

in

future

creditworthiness.” 160 His study concludes that “counseling has little effect on repeat
bankruptcy in the first five years after an initial bankruptcy filing.” 161 Indeed repeat
bankruptcies may be “an indication that our bankruptcy system is not responding
effectively to the inadequate knowledge and financial skills of first-time bankrupts.” 162
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It is not clear that bankrupts are gaining the necessary skills to avoid a repeat
bankruptcy. In refusing a discharge in a fourth time bankruptcy case, the court in Re
Hiebert 163 concluded:
I am not satisfied that Hiebert has gained sufficient insight into proper financial
management, budgeting and use of credit, nor am I persuaded that he has made appropriate
changes in his life to prevent another bankruptcy from occurring. Regrettably, I conclude
that the protection of society and unsuspecting creditors can only be achieved by refusing
his discharge application. 164

In another fourth time bankruptcy case, Mr. Boivin indicated that “during the
current bankruptcy he had attended credit counselling of a type he had not received
before.” 165 Boivin alleged that from the counselling “he [felt] he [had] made tremendous
progress he in understanding how to live within his means.” 166 Notwithstanding the
bankrupt’s reference to credit counselling, the court was “not satisfied that the bankrupt
[had] gained sufficient insight and made sufficient changes in his life that it [was] not
reasonably possible that a further bankruptcy [would] occur.” 167
Over a period of 30 years this bankrupt has left unpaid creditors with total debts of about
$834,000 due to his profligate and utterly irresponsible use of credit or failure to pay
taxes....[H]e has...had a financially pestilential effect on those unpaid creditors he has left
in his wake. 168

Finally, if mandatory counselling was serving its intended purpose, one would expect that
the overall repeat filing rate would be decreasing and not increasing.
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VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS?
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Over time a number of solutions have been proposed to deal with the ongoing
problem of repeat bankruptcies. For example, provisions relating to repeat bankruptcies
may be traced back to a 1732 English statute. 169 Under this provision, a bankrupt was
entitled to a discharge for a second time only if a 75% dividend was paid in the second
case. 170 Given this high dividend threshold it seems likely that under such a regime few
bankrupts received a discharge in the second case. The current US solution, which
prevents a debtor from receiving a discharge in a second chapter 7 case within eight
years, 171 is over inclusive.

The eight year time bar does not distinguish between

behavioural debtors and structural debtors (ie debtors who failed for reasons beyond their
control.) All debtors are equally barred.
Any Canadian reforms might target second time bankrupts. Second time
bankruptcies represent the highest proportion of all repeat bankruptcies. Further, initial
data on the 2009 amendments suggests that a significant percentage of those second time
bankrupts are receiving an automatic discharge after 24 months. If there is concern
second time bankrupts are flowing through the automatic discharge regime unopposed,
one might look to current OSB policy on second time bankrupts for a possible reform
solution. It is current OSB policy that “if a person has filed a second bankruptcy within a
three year period subsequent to a previous discharge” 172 the file will automatically be
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flagged by the OSB for review to determine whether the OSB should intervene in the
bankruptcy discharge hearing. If the high rate of second time automatic discharges
continues unabated one might translate OSB policy into legislation. Where a person has
filed a second bankruptcy within a three year period subsequent to a previous discharge
the BIA could be amended to provide that the person is not entitled to an automatic

discharge and the matter should be referred to the court for a discharge hearing. In that
situation the court shall either refuse the discharge, suspend the discharge or impose a
conditional order. 173
While such an approach would be able to remedy an abusive second filing, the
court would also have the discretion to fashion an appropriate solution where the debtor
had failed for reasons beyond his or her control. Unlike the US provision, the proposal
does not set up an automatic three year time bar. The reform proposal would merely
trigger a discharge hearing when that second bankruptcy falls within three years of the
prior discharge.
CONCLUSION
Repeat bankruptcies come with certain costs. In particular they can contribute to
slower economic growth by “increasing the costs for goods, services and credit.” 174
Indeed, creditors interviewed in the AEB study indicated a lower repeat filing rate could
lead to lower consumer credit costs. 175 Additionally, repeat bankruptcies “can lead to
increased ... administration costs due to the processing of filings and the monitoring of
173
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the debtor.” 176 Repeat bankruptcies also come with economic costs for the debtor. 177 A
repeat bankrupt may remain an undischarged bankrupt for a substantial period of time.
This will have a significant impact on the debtor’s ability to obtain credit. The BIA
makes it an offence for a bankrupt to obtain credit of $1000 or more from any person
“without informing them that the undischarged bankrupt is an undischarged bankrupt.” 178
In particular, abusive repeat filings (i.e. where moral hazard problems are present)
create problems for the bankruptcy system in Canada and elsewhere. 179 The task,
however, is to separate the abusive repeat filings from the repeat filings that arise from
circumstances that may be beyond the control of the debtor. 180 It is important to
distinguish between those debtors who require more than one bankruptcy to obtain a
release of their debts and a debtor who is “abusing the system to escape their credit
obligations.” 181 Given the high percentage of second time bankrupts receiving an
automatic discharge, one must ask whether the new second time regime is able to draw
this distinction.
Mandatory counselling may not be the solution to the problem of repeat
bankruptcies. Although counselling seeks to provide bankrupts with necessary financial
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skills for financial success, repeat bankrupts still identify the misuse of credit as the

leading cause of failure. Further, the fact that many bankrupts repeat patterns of financial
mismanagement suggests that mandatory counselling may not be an effective way to
reduce multiple filings. Indeed, bankrupts must learn something from the counselling
sessions or they risk the chance of return. 182 Repeat filings also raise questions about the
role that creditors play in making credit available to former bankrupts. To what extent
should lenders bear some responsibility for the repeat bankruptcy problem? 183
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